



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 November 2017

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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Northeast Asia


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
Executive Summary: In November, IED activity across the Asia-Pacific region increased substantially from October 2017. IED events more than doubled from last month, while IED-related casualties quadrupled. In South Asia, IED activity was nearly three times higher than October, and IED-related casualty rates were eight times higher. In Southeast Asia, IED activity remained relatively stable, however, there was a 64% increase in IED-related casualties. There were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia this month.

There were 136 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in November 2017




Icons depict events for November 2017; heat map depicts event density from November 2016 - November 2017


November IED events



November IED events by Country




November IED Casualties



[Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.](#)

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

November Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




Executive Summary (Continued)

In South Asia, IED activity increased from 40 events in October to 112 events in November. IED-related casualties also increased from last month, from 11 to 89 casualties. This spike was primarily caused by a sharp increase of IED activity in Nepal. In Bangladesh, IED activity slightly decreased from last month, and there were no reported IED-related casualties (**see pg. 9**). In India, IED events were comparable to October; however, IED-related casualties were three and a half times higher compared to last month (**see pg. 10**). In Nepal, political violence stemming from Parliamentary elections contributed to the country's highest rate of IED attacks and IED-related casualties since 2009 (**see pg. 11**). Nepal had 50 IED-related casualties in November; 40 of these casualties were wounded civilians. In the Maldives, authorities recovered an IED cache, which is the first event since April 2017 (**see pg. 12**).

In Southeast Asia, IED activity continued to level off, although IED-related casualties increased from last month with 14 casualties in October compared to 23 casualties in November. In the Philippines, there was a 6% drop in IED events and a 17% increase in IED-related casualties (**see pg. 14**). In Thailand, there was a slight increase in the number of IED events and IED-related casualties compared to October (**see pg. 15**).


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Icons depict events from September 2016 to September 2017; occasional overlap occurs

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: First reported RCIED in Nepal

On 28 NOV, Nepal Army EOD defused an RCIED near the border security office of the Armed Police Force in Ranjitpur, Saptari. The device, made from a 5-liter pressure cooker, incorporated approximately 2kg of RDX explosives. Authorities recovered the device after arresting two suspected Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (Netra Bikram Chand) (CPN(M)) militants with a remote control. The militants were allegedly planning to detonate the device at a house in Rajbiraj, and District Police stated the remote control had a maximum effective distance of 1km.

RDX is a stable, commercially produced plastic explosive that has been used by militants in other South Asian countries. It is probable that militants have used Nepal as an RDX transit or facilitation point. There have been several incidents involving Pakistanis transporting and using RDX to attack Indian targets, such as those involved in the 2006 Mumbai train attack during which seven pressure cooker IEDs packed with RDX and ammonium nitrate killed or wounded 900 civilians; shortly after the attack, Nepalese authorities arrested two Pakistanis with RDX at a Kathmandu hotel for their involvement. RDX is a common Commercial Grade Explosive (CGE) and is increasingly pilfered from legitimate supply chains that provide CGE to the mining, energy and demolition sectors. IED facilitation networks and bomb makers exploit the largest legitimate manufacturing region for CGE out of Eastern India. This includes legitimate supply chains into the Raxaul import zone of Nepal.



RCIED recovered in Saptari

In November, politically motivated IED activity in Nepal spiked to the highest level in two years; overall IED activity in the last six months has been at its highest sustained levels since the end of the civil war. This violence was motivated primarily by elections at all levels of governance. Much of this activity was attributed to CPN(M) (**see MAY 2017 VOI**), as they attempted to disrupt the election process and scare voters away from the polls. On 1 DEC, Nepalese security agencies released a statement through the Saptari District Administrative Office that called the CPN(M) the biggest threat to security during the election season. The next elections will be held on 7 DEC, and IED activity will likely remain consistently high until elections are complete.

Sources: OhMyNews (7/14/06) Hindu (3/22/12) Conflict Armament Research (2/16) Himalayan Times (12/1/17) Zaubu

Special Assessment: Rising Violence in the Maldives

On 16 NOV, Maldivian authorities detained two suspects in Malé along with an IED cache containing bomb making materials. One of the suspects was a senior gang member, and authorities suspect both detainees have ties with unidentified foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). This incident is the most recent in a growing trend of violence in the Maldives that can be roughly categorized into two groups: criminal gang activity and terrorism. These two types of activity can intersect, as seen with the suspect above. With 154,000 residents living in six square kilometers, Maldives' capital, Malé, is one of the most densely populated cities on earth. This, coupled with the Maldives' strategic geography and restive extremist elements, creates conditions that are ripe for rising violence in the island nation.

Gang activity in the Maldives is a relatively new phenomenon with roots in the establishment of illicit drug activity in the 1970s-1990s. Based off a study done by the Asian Foundation in 2011, 54% of gang members polled were active drug users. Interviews of gang members identified three additional reasons for the rapid increase in the number of gangs in the early 2000s: the death of a prisoner in 2003 at the hand of Maldivian authorities, the use of gangs by political parties to extend their influence and power, and the 2004 prison riots to justify a crack-down on political reformists. As of 2011, there are an estimated 20-30 gangs operating in Malé, most of which are engaged in some sort of illegal activity (drug trade, smuggling, violence, etc.); 63% of polled gang members were unemployed and many gangs are paid by political and business actors to commit violent acts, riot/protest, destroy property, or intimidate individuals. Most of those individuals polled had been previously detained by authorities, and many had served prison time.

In many countries, prisons serve as centers for radicalization and the propagation of jihadi philosophy; based on eyewitness accounts, it is likely that the prison system in the Maldives is serving in a similar capacity for gang members. The head of the Buru gang, Hafez, said in an interview that criminals often become radicalized in Maldivian jails, and radicalized prisoners are not segregated from the rest of the prison population. Upon exiting the prison system, newly radicalized individuals have the potential to spread extremist ideologies within the greater community; many of those radicalized in the Maldives left for the Middle East over the last three years. Estimates of the total number of Maldivians who have left to fight in Syria and Iraq ranges between 50-250 individuals, fighting for either the al-Qa'ida-backed al-Nusra Front or ISIS. Previous gang members/prisoners likely make up a good number of those fighters. One gang, the Kuda Henveiru, had 12 members leave for Syria in one month in 2015. Authorities had imprisoned two leaders from the gang in 2012, and after their release they began advocating extremist ideology to the members. One Kuda Henveiru member, who had also been incarcerated, told his family before leaving for Syria that local clerics told him it was better die waging jihad than to go to prison for drug offenses.




Image taken from a YouTube video released by Maldivians fighting in Syria depicting the destruction of images of Maldives' current and former leaders - June 2016

Radicalization has not only touched those interested in travelling to fight in the Middle East, but also many Maldivians who have remained in country. Reporting of activity related to VEOs and terrorism in the Maldives has been on the rise over the last couple of years, coinciding with an increase in ISIS activity and access to the Internet. Some reports also cite a rise in overall conservatism due to growing Saudi Arabian influence, as evidenced by an increase in Wahhabi mosques, education funds, and infrastructure investments over the past several years. Government officials have disputed the existence of Wahabism in the country, with Police Spokesman Ahmed Shifan blaming teachers educated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Public displays of growing conservatism and radicalization have become more prevalent as well. In 2014, an estimated 200 protestors took to the streets of Malé with black flags demanding an end to democracy and calling for the implementation of Sharia law; the march ended with a communal prayer for Mujahideen waging jihad. Likewise, a man was arrested in Malé for



Protestors waving black flags and calling for an end to democracy - September 2014

Special Assessment: Rising Violence in the Maldives



Social media post from May 2017 showing a black flag in Malé

raising a black flag on the beach in May 2017; an image of the flag was posted on social media, as well as a post saying ISIS members were actively engaged in the country. A suspect connected to the raising of the black flag was arrested, but no further details on his identity were released to media.

Over the last year, there have been several other incidents of extremist activity and violence against individuals who speak out against extremism. On 23 APR, a prominent blogger and human rights activist, Yameen Rasheed, was stabbed 35 times in the stairwell of his apartment complex, and died at the scene. He had previously received death threats for expressing his views against Islamic extremism, and it is highly unlikely this was a random act of violence. Hearings for the six men suspected in the case are closed to the public, despite local and international outcry. Other prominent bloggers and free speech advocates in the Maldives have also received threats, forcing many underground out of fear for their lives. Two days after Rasheed's murder, an online post from a group called Qafila threatened to carry out beheadings of secularists identified on a hit list; the post showed journalist Ahmed Rilwan (1) who disappeared in 2014, Yameen Rasheed (2), and "Loading Next" (3). Rilwan, one of Rasheed's close friends, has been missing since 2014; two suspects arrested for his disappearance have ties to the Kuda Henveiru gang, and a third suspect is said to have fled after the murder and died fighting in Syria. Another writer, Hilath Rasheed,

has survived three murder attempts, including having his throat cut, by Islamic extremists. The attacks on writers and secularists currently occurring in the Maldives are strikingly similar to attacks on bloggers, journalists, activists, and foreigners in Bangladesh from 2013-2016, carried out by Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team), an al-Qa'ida affiliated militant group, which led to the injury or death of 10 secularists and 35 other individuals.

On 24 APR, the day after Yameen Rasheed's murder, police raided several locations in Malé. At one location, three suspects were arrested with 10kg of TNT while attempting to assemble an IED. At a second location, another individual was arrested with pressure cookers, wires, and phones. According to media sources, the four suspects were allegedly planning to detonate IEDs at five different locations around Malé, and were involved in recruiting efforts for militant groups in Syria and Iraq. On 14 SEP, authorities arrested two suspected ISIS militants for planning a suicide attack in Malé; one was charged with planning the attack, and the other was charged with attempting to carry it out. The arrests came shortly after the UK raised its alert level, stating terrorist attacks are very likely in the Maldives on its official travel website.

In the coming months it is probable that Maldives will continue to experience extremist activity. Political instability, a growing threat of local and online radicalization, and a lack of transparency in the justice system are just a few of the factors that could increase the likelihood of VEO activity in the Maldives. The return of fighters from Syria and Iraq with operational experience and radical ideology is feasible in the Maldives due to the difficulties of securing borders due to natural geography; the porousness of the Maldives' borders could likewise contribute to it acting as a facilitation hub for terrorists, smugglers, and drug/human traffickers. Also concerning is the possibility that Maldivian extremists will involve themselves in other plots around the Asia-Pacific region: a recent sweep of an ISIS terror cell in Malaysia led to the arrest of 19 suspected militants, including two Maldivians. The growing threat from ISIS-aligned groups and the potential resurgence of al-Qa'ida affiliates across the region make it even more imperative that the local threat of violence made by gangs and radicalized youth, as well as other forms of illegal activity, are identified and quickly stemmed.



Social media post from Qafila, supporting the murder and disappearance of secular writers

Sources: Asia Foundation (2012) Maldives Culture (9/11/12) FIDH (9/17/12) MiniVan News (9/6/14) Guardian (2/26/15) MI (4/6/16) MI (6/3/16) Maldives Murders (2017) UK Government Travel (2017) Wion (1/11/17) AHT (3/4/17) SCMP (3/12/17) Mihaaru (4/27/17) MI (5/10/17) MI (5/11/17) Sun (5/16/17) MI (5/25/17) Raajje (7/29/17) Mihaaru (7/30/17) Straits Times (9/5/17) Mihaaru (9/6/17) MI (10/30/17) MI (11/14/17) Reuters (11/15/17)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Esmael Abdulmalik/Abdulmaguid

ALIAS: Commander Toraife/Torayfe; Abu Toraife/Toraype/Turaipe **FROM:** Philippines
AREA OF OPERATION: Southern Philippines **AFFILIATIONS:** JMWA/JWA; DIM; BIFF; ISIS

Esmael Abdulmalik is the founder and leader of an ISIS-aligned faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) known as the Jamaatul Mujahideen Wal Ansar/Jamaah Al Muhajirin wal Anshor (JMWA/JWA) also referred to as Dawlah Islamiyah Maguindanao (DIM). Abdulmalik is believed to be an influential cleric, skilled bomb maker, and student of late Malaysian IED trainer, Zuklifi bin Hir Marwan. Abdulmalik reportedly remains an outspoken cleric who openly espouses ISIS ideology; and is considered to be a candidate to replace the late Isnilon Hapilon, as the new ISIS Southeast Asia (SEA) Emir. As of November 2017, Abdulmalik is believed to be recruiting children and teenagers in North Cotabato to join the ranks of JMWA.



JMWA broke away from the BIFF in October 2016 and is believed to be the most radical of the three BIFF factions. JMWA is reported to be comprised of remnants of local militant groups and possibly foreign fighters (from Iraq, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) following the Marawi conflict. While a majority of militant groups associated with the Marawi conflict appear to be laying low, JMWA has been active since early-June 2017. Throughout this time period JMWA has raised ISIS flags over the Maguindanao towns of Shariff Aguak and Datu Unsay and conducting harassment attacks against Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Philippine Security Forces. As recent as mid-November 2017, the group has been reported as operating in Carmen town, North Cotabato..

Continued encounters between JMWA and the MILF could possibly drive MILF ISIS sympathizers to defect and align themselves with JMWA. MILF defectors, sympathizing splinter factions and JMWA recruitment efforts in North Cotabato could provide a much-needed boost to JMWA's dwindling fighter base. Additionally, should ISIS-Core appoint a new SEA Emir, it would demonstrate its commitment to a SEA regional caliphate, further emboldening splinter militant groups as they regroup following their defeat in the Marawi conflict.

Sources: Benarnews (9/29/17) RSIS (10/17) Rappler (10/15/17) Stratfor (10/26/17) Inquirer (11/16/17) Concept Central (11/16/17) Asia Times (11/22/17) | Special thanks to the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) who collaborated and provided valuable input on this POI.

VEO: al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: South Asia and Afghanistan **LEADER:** Asim Umar **ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS:** Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Indian Mujahideen (IM)



جماعت قاعدة الجهاد في شبه القارة الهندية

The creation of al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was announced by AQ leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a video released on 4 SEP 2014. In the video, Zawahiri announced AQ's intention to open a theater of operations targeting Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Burma, claiming it had worked over the previous two years to "gather the mujahideen in the Indian subcontinent into a single entity," that would "crush the artificial borders" dividing Muslim populations in the region. To this end, Zawahiri appointed Asim Umar—an Indian national and prominent TTP commander—to lead the group's operations. In an apparent show of force, the announcement was bookended by the assassination of a senior officer in the Pakistan Army on 2 SEP 2014 and an attempt to hijack a Pakistani Navy F-22P Frigate on 6 SEP 2014; both events AQIS claimed responsibility.

Since then, however, AQIS has struggled to conduct major attacks and has publically claimed responsibility for only a handful of murders in Bangladesh. There are three likely reasons for this lack of activity. First is the rising popularity of ISIS, which the announcement of AQIS was likely hoping to blunt. Second, the IM—assessed to be among the groups consolidating under the AQ banner, and one of the most active—was effectively dismantled in March 2014, mere months before the AQIS announcement. Lastly, by aligning themselves against Pakistan, AQIS made themselves a target in their main base of operations, which eventually ended with the Pakistani announcement in February 2016 that they had dismantled the group's presence in the country, pushing them back into Afghanistan.

Despite its initial setbacks, AQIS appears to be both gaining strength and refocusing its mission to global operations more traditional to AQ, but at the expense of its initial south-Asian focus. Because of its affiliation to the Taliban, AQIS is alleged to have a presence in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, and Nuristan provinces, and was able to reopen large training camps in Afghanistan, which were discovered as early as 2015. On 5 DEC 2017, U.S. forces reported that the AQIS No. 2 leader Omar bin Khatab was killed in Ghazni province, and 80 other AQIS members were killed and 27 captured in parallel operations in Zabul and Paktia. As ISIS has declined, AQIS has commenced attempts to regain its global jihad leadership, ramping up its propaganda campaign with the release of a new code of conduct that differentiates it from ISIS in religious scholarship, strategy, and the unprincipled violence for which the group was known.

Sources: Long War Journal (9/5/14) Indian Express (3/30/17) VOA News (2/12/16) NDTV (7/14/17) Long War Journal (6/26/17) The Diplomat (6/29/17) Washington Post (12/5/17)

South Asia: November Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 7 NOV, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested two members of Ansar al-Islam (alias Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) from Siddhirganj, Narayanganj. The RAB officers recovered weapons, jihadi literature and leaflets. ABT is an al-Qa'ida backed militant group that operates in Bangladesh and India. **Eurasia Review (11/20/17)**

India

On 5 NOV, media reported that both India and Bangladesh have recognized that terror organizations may target Rohingya refugees for recruitment, and have agreed to conduct bi-lateral training in Patna Danapur cantonment from 13 NOV to 10 DEC. This interaction will be the first major training between the two countries and will consist primarily of Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism training and equipment fielding, led by Indian Army Colonel D.D. Swain. **India.com (11/11/17) Daily Pioneer (11/05/17)**

On 6 NOV, media reported that ISIS recruiter, Abu Zaid, was arrested upon his arrival to Mumbai airport from Saudi Arabia. The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had discovered Zaid's terror cell in April 2017 and suspects there are approximately 15 members. Allegedly Zaid and his recruits were planning an attack in India, but authorities detained him before he could raise enough funds. **Mid-Day (11/06/17)**

On 22 NOV, media recognized multiple terror incidents where insurgents utilized the border areas of Bangladesh and India as safe havens and transit points rather than target areas. Insurgent groups such as Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), ISIS and allegedly a resurgence of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) have reportedly used this area to transit people and equipment as early as 22 JAN 2002. **Times of India (11/22/17)**


On 23 NOV, three suspects were arrested by Kolkata Police special task force (STF) from the Kolkata Railway Station, two of the three suspects were members of Bangladeshi VEO Ansar al-Islam (alias Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT)) which reportedly has direct links with al-Qa'ida. After interrogation of the ABT members, a follow-on raid was conducted on the last suspect's residence, who allegedly planned to supply the ABT members with weapons and explosives. Media also reported that two of the ABT members were Bangladeshi citizens that used a fake (Aadhaar) ID made in Karnataka in order to falsify a West Bengal address; police are investigating the fake ID operations deriving from Karnataka. **Daily News and Analysis (11/23/17) Indian Express (11/26/17)**

On 28 NOV, the Punjab police began modernizing their equipment in the Pathankot Area. The approval of funding allowed the force to request 3000 AK-47 Rifles, two mine-resistant vehicles, 16 bullet proof vehicles, handheld thermal imagers, and 3 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for use near the border. **Times of India (11/28/17)**

Nepal

On 26 NOV, Nepal went to the polls for the first round of national elections to elect the Parliament and Provincial Assembly legislators. There were 320 candidates vying for the 37 Parliamentary seats, and 482 candidates nominated for the 74 seats in the Provincial Assemblies. Some of the main items covered on the election platforms of many of the candidates were development, economic growth, and management of rural issues. The new Parliament will be in place by 21 JAN 2018, as mandated by the Constitution. Many Nepalese have expressed hope that the country will begin to stabilize politically, and economic development will become more of a priority. **Diplomat (11/16/17) al Jazeera (11/26/17)**

Bangladesh: November IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and three IED cache events.


On 16 NOV, police recovered an IED cache during a raid at a suspected Neo-Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) house in Nawduli, Naogaon; authorities arrested five suspected militants. The cache contained two pistols, 13 rounds of ammunition, electronic devices, explosives and grenade making materials. **Dhaka Tribune (11/16/17)**

On 28 NOV, three PBIEDs detonated during a raid by RAB officers on a suspected Neo-JMB hideout in Char Alatuli, Chapainawabganj; three militants killed. Following the raid, the RAB recovered an IED cache. The cache contained seven detonators, 12 explosive gel packs, two pistols, three grenades, and three IEDs. **Daily Star (11/28/17)**


November IED activity remained low, likely attributed to Security Forces' execution of counter-terror operations. IED activity followed the predictable pattern of arrests followed by raids of militant hideouts. PBIEDs have become a commonplace IED TTP in Bangladesh over the past year, with this month's detonation listed as the 23rd event since March.

India continues to be a supply conduit for illicit weapons as exemplified by task force raids in Kolkata. An alleged arms dealer and affiliated ABT members were arrested last month in West Bengal – an area historically used to facilitate weapons and other materials into Bangladesh. Captured documents indicated that the ABT members were well-connected in Hyderabad; using counterfeit IDs they worked in a slaughterhouse and learned how to manufacture IED circuits.

Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: November IED Events




There were 18 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, and eight IED cache events.

On 6 NOV, Bhupalpally Police found and cleared two CWIEDs between Abbaigudem and Aluvaka, Bhupalpally, Telangana. The two command-wire IEDs were composed of aluminum buckets with a total of approximately 25kg of explosives, emplaced approximately two feet apart under an improved road. A tunnel was drilled from the side of the road to the undercarriage area in order to emplace the device and then filled with stones, which police estimate would have taken 10-12 days to accomplish. Police note this is a shift away from the previous TTP of emplacing devices in culverts. **Times of India (11/7/17)**

On 13 NOV, the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF) detonated an RCIED against an Assam Rifles patrol in Maha Mani, Chandel, Manipur; two Assam Rifles personnel were killed, and six were injured. The device was emplaced along the roadside near the District Collectorate. Notably, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) denounced the attack, claiming it was designed to derail peace talks, and officially expressed condolences to the wounded government personnel. **New Indian Express (11/13/17)**
Firstpost (11/13/17) **ePao (11/14/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type




On 20 NOV, an IED detonated while a Hazaribag bomb squad was attempting to render it safe at the Saria Police Station in Giridih, Jharkhand; two police personnel were killed and three were wounded. The IED was kept in the station armory, and had been there for six months along with several other seized devices. **Hindustan Times (11/20/17)** **Business Standard (11/20/17)**

On 23 NOV, Baresaad Police and a bomb disposal squad found and cleared a daisy-chain IED in Budha Prahar, Latehar, Jharkhand. The device was reportedly composed of 30 IEDs emplaced "in series," and was discovered as police were responding to a Maoist attack on a nearby construction site. The device was likely emplaced by Maoists in anticipation of the police response. **New Indian Express (11/23/17)**

On 30 NOV, an RCIED was found and cleared at an iron and steel shop in Khuyathong Polem Leikai, Imphal West, Manipur. The device was designed to detonate if attempts were made to defuse or remove it. While the owner suspects the device was likely related to extortion, there was no demand letter. The device was found on the last day of a new festival, which has been targeted by militants recently. **ePao (11/30/17)** **Nagaland Post (11/30/17)**

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




Overall IED activity remained steady in November, with Maoist activity appearing at normal levels, and a number of events in the Northeast. Despite reduced political violence, the lethality of devices appears to have increased due to the increase in casualties.

Telangana has not been a source of Maoist IED activity for some time, especially as the region has improved economically. Many Maoists are from Telangana, and the 6 NOV event is an indicator they are trying to return to the area, but traction is likely to be low. NSCN-IM's reaction to the 13 NOV event indicates peace talks are likely going well, and the group is trying to curry favor with India by showing public support. The 30 NOV RCIED appears to be part of a trend among northeastern militants against economic development by migrants to the area from the Indian heartland. Targeting civilians is a risky strategy, and it's unclear how it will play out.


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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Nepal: November IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were 44 IED detonation events, 27 IED found and cleared events, and three IED cache events.

On 17 NOV, an IED thrown at political candidates wounded six in Kauthela, Kakani-5, Nuwakot, Bagmati. Media reported the event as an assassination attempt. **Nepal Monitor (11/17/17) Kathmandu Post (11/17/17)**

On 18 NOV, an IED detonation outside Radha Krishna temple injured eight civilians in Chandrapur-5, Rautahat, Narayani. Authorities suspect the Communist Party of Nepal (Biplav) was responsible. **Nepal Monitor (11/19/17)**

On 26 NOV, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared a pipe bomb and two IEDs at polling stations in Bhimeshwar, Dolakha, Janakpur. The devices were likely left to frighten locals away from voting. **Nepal Monitor (11/26/17)**

On 26 NOV, a timed IED detonated at a passenger terminal in a shopping area near the location of a political rally in Manahari Bazaar, Makwanpur, Narayani. Authorities suspect Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) - Netra Bikram Chand were responsible. **Nepal Monitor (11/26/17)**

On 28 NOV, an IED detonated killing a temporary police officer and injuring eight civilians near a corner store in Tulsipur-5, Dang, Rapti. The detonation targeted the Prime Minister of Nepal, Sher Bahadur Deuba and other senior political figures. **Kathmandu Post (11/28/17) Nepal Monitor (11/29/17)**


On 28 NOV, an RCIED was found and cleared near and Armed Police Force base in Rajbiraj, Saptari, Sagarmatha; two suspected Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) militants detained with a remote control. The IED incorporated 2kg RDX explosives and a 5-liter pressure cooker (see **Device Highlight**). **Nepal Monitor (11/28/17) Himalayan Times (11/28/17)**

On 30 NOV, an IED detonated at a Nepali Congress political rally, injuring 17 civilians in Bhaladmi Tolle, Itahari-9, Sunsari, Kosi. Four of the civilians were seriously wounded. **Nepal Monitor (11/30/17)**

In November, IED activity spiked to its highest levels since the end of the civil war due to elections on both 26 NOV and 7 DEC. While many of the IEDs were socket bombs and "sutali" bombs (both usually thrown and impact detonated crude devices) there were some more advanced TTPs reported. The discovery of an RCIED pressure cooker incorporating RDX was very surprising, as a device this sophisticated has never been observed previously. Another surprising feature of the IED activity in November was the targeting of high level politicians and political candidates. Many of the attacks were very bold, and have been labeled assassination attempts by the media. Militants also emplaced IEDs near the homes of political candidates with the likely intention to intimidate and harass them, and possibly to cause property damage. IED activity will likely remain elevated until shortly after the 7 DEC elections, though it may continue well beyond that date if militants and political extremist elements of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) contest elections or continue agitating.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Maldives: November IED Events




There was one IED cache recovered.

On 16 NOV, a joint operation of Maldives Police Services Counter-Terrorism Department and the Serious and Organized Crime Department recovered an IED cache in Malé; authorities detained two suspects. The cache contained explosive materials. One of the suspects was a known gang leader and both were connected to foreign terrorists (see **Special Assessment**). **MI (11/16/17) Mihaaru (11/16/17)**

This is the first IED event reported in the Maldives since April 2017. Both events were cache recoveries of items being used to create IEDs by individuals with foreign terrorism connections (see Special Assessment). It is highly likely that IED activity will remain low in the Maldives in the short term, though concerning trends of radicalization could change that in the long term.

Past Year IED Events by Type



Southeast Asia: November Significant Activity

Philippines

On 23 NOV, President Duterte signed a proclamation formally ending peace negotiations with the communist rebels. The government put forth its best efforts to speed up and implement the signing of a peace agreement; however, the New People's Army (NPA) has continued its acts of violence and hostilities. The President expressed frustration that the communists were not "serious" in pursuing peace negotiations after the deaths of soldier and police during recent NPA attacks. He went on to say if the NPA continue their acts of violence, the government will apply the same force. President Duterte instructed police and military to shoot any armed NPA member as his new approach with dealing with these rebels. An executive order is being written to declare the NPA as a terrorist organization. **ABS-CBN (11/23/17) Rappler (11/29/17)**

During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting earlier this month, Presidents Trump and Duterte met face-to-face for the first time and discussed topics ranging from trade issues to combating ISIS. The meeting was called a success and is the start to move the relationship between the two countries forward. Duterte said the United States was an important ally, contrasting sharply with Duterte's statements a year ago. **New York Times (11/13/17) Bloomberg (11/13/17)**

The International Alert provided a report entitled "Conflict Alert 2017" that highlighted an increase of violence in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) during the 2016 national elections. Shadow economies, such as drug trafficking, have funded extremist groups with terror activities in Mindanao, leading to increased violence on the southern island. The report said all provinces in the ARMM saw an increase in violent events, particularly on Basilan and Maguindanao, and contributed directly to the Marawi conflict. **Business Mirror (11/29/17) Rappler (11/29/17)**

Thailand

On 19 NOV, security forces increased their presence along the Thailand-Malaysia border in search of about 25 Chinese Uyghurs, who had escaped from a nearby immigration detention center. **Fox News (11/21/17) Reuters (11/19/17)**

On 22 NOV, Royal Thai Police arrested Wanna Suansan (29), the first Thai national detained for taking part in the 2015 Erawan Shrine bombing that killed 20 and injured 120 in Bangkok. According to Suansan's family she had been in Turkey since 2015 and returned to prove her innocence. Officials believe she helped facilitate the attack by renting apartments for two other suspects to construct the IEDs; the suspects were also friends of her Turkish husband, Emrah Davutoglu. Authorities charged Suansan with premeditated murder, attempted murder, fatal bombing and illegal bomb possession and will be facing military court. Police are currently seeking 14 other suspects associated with the attack. **Bangkok Post (11/22/17) RFA (11/22/17)**

Burma

In November, Burmese security forces found one tunnel in two separate villages of the Maungtau Township, reportedly built by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The tunnels were infrastructure support to the ARSA as they oppose the Burmese Army in the Maungtau area of Rakhine state. A tunnel was also found earlier in June 2017. The longest tunnel was around 130ft long and could accommodate 20 to 25 individuals. It seems that the tunnels discovered have acted as nothing more than hiding places for the ARSA. Tunneling has been used in Afghanistan and most recently in Marawi City, Philippines. **Myanmar International TV (11/07/17) Eleven Myanmar (11/14/17) Myanmar Times (06/20/17)**

Singapore-Indonesia

From 28-29 NOV, Singaporean and Indonesian armies held their first counterterrorism table-top exercise. The exercise tested operational responses to scenarios such as bomb threats in public areas, vehicles ramming into pedestrians and gunmen attacks in shopping malls. This was the first bilateral counterterrorism table-top exercise Singapore has been involved in. The delegations were made up of members of their respective operations and intelligence departments, and personnel from their Special Operations and Maritime Security Task Forces. The exercise also involved the homeland security forces from the Singapore Police Force and the Indonesian National Agency for Combatting Terrorism (BNPT). The two countries plan to conduct more regular exercises that would facilitate counter terrorism such as in the areas of maritime cooperation, information sharing, and best practices. **Today Online (11/28/17)**

Indonesia

This past month, tensions escalated in West Papua's long-simmering insurgency. A state of emergency has been declared in the remote region and about 300 additional security forces have been deployed to the mining area of the eastern province to address an alleged hostage situation and a string of at least 15 shootings since August 2017 that killed two police officers and wounded twelve. Papua police claimed that a splinter group from the separatist Free Papua Movement (OPM), the separatist National Liberation Army of West Papua (TPNPB), were behind recent attacks. Police also assert that TPNPB are effectively holding about 1,000 local villagers hostage by preventing them from leaving an area near a giant copper mine in Tembagapura. The local military commander said that they are conducting surveillance of the affected villages. With police, the military hopes to negotiate a solution, but they are preparing other measures. **ABC (11/9/17) (11/10/17) Reuters (11/11/17) (11/14/17)**

Philippines: November IED Events



There were six IED detonation events, four IED found and cleared events, and five IED cache events.

On 1 NOV, a joint operation by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and Joint Task Force General Santos City recovered a cache following an operation in Maasim, Sarangani, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao island. They raided a residence of two Ansar Khilafah – Philippines (AKP) members. The cache contained drugs, several explosive devices, ammunition, currency and an ISIS flag. PDEA reports the duo are key players of AKP and are said to be protecting the 'El Patron Drug Group' which operates in South Central Mindanao. **Rappler (11/3/17)**


On 8 NOV, the Philippine army recovered an IED cache following a small arms firefight with NPA rebels in Sarayon, Araibo, Pantukan, Compostela Valley, Davao, Mindanao island. The cache contained 12 bags of IED components and wires. **Mindanao Times (11/9/17)**

On 22 NOV, police found and cleared an IED when civilians spotted the device amongst parked vehicles in Kalawag, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao island. The device, which was found near a venue in which people were celebrating the weeklong "Kalimudan Festival," was made of black powder, cut nails, and metal sheets with a torch as the device's trigger. **Inquirer Mindanao (11/23/17)**


On 22 NOV, an IED detonated at the Citizens Armed Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Sibalom, Antique, Western Visayas, Panay island. A second device detonated when three patrol cars arrived responding to the first incident, wounding three police officers. Authorities suspect the NPA were responsible for the attacks. **Manila Bulletin (11/22/17)**

On 26 NOV, suspected NPA rebels detonated an IED on a backhoe at a quarry in Orong, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Western Visayas, Negros island. Prior to the explosion, the rebels took cellphones from the employees. The attack came after the President cancelled all peace talks with the rebels. **Philippine Daily Inquirer (11/27/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



In November, IED activity remained consistent with the two previous months, and the majority of events were linked to the NPA. The NPA have continued their attacks against military and police along with the harassment of civilian targets. These attacks are on a path to increase due to the President formally ending all peace talks with the now called "terrorists" (see **SEA SIGACTs**).

Clearing operations continued in Marawi, and authorities expect that it will take at least another six months to clear all of the UXO and IEDs from the area. The AFP reports the Maute Group is recruiting residents in Lanao del Sur province, with the majority being relatives of the Maute men who were killed. It's unlikely another siege will occur soon as the new militants will likely face difficulty in recruiting and mobilizing the large numbers seen in Marawi. Following the loss in Marawi, it is very possible that most militants will return to their previous operations, such as Kidnap for Ransom (KFR), killing local opponents, and conducting small scale IED attacks.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: November IED Events



There were four IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and one IED cache event.

On 12 NOV, an RCIED detonated against armored vehicles carrying paramilitary rangers on patrol in Bannang Sata District in Yala; four rangers were injured. The device was made from a gas cylinder buried in a drainage pipe under the road and is believed to have weighed 20kg. A 100-meter electric wire was found connected to device leading to a wooded area beside the road. The explosion left a crater about 1.5m deep and 1m in diameter. **Bangkok Post (11/12/17) Thai PBS English News (11/12/17)**

On 17 NOV, militants detonated an IED against first responders after setting fire to two motorcycles in front of the Sirirat Samakkhi School in Pattani. Authorities also found and cleared an IED that had not yet been detonated from the same locaiton. **The Nation (11/17/17)**

On 21 NOV, insurgents detonated a roadside RCIED against a police team assigned to protect teachers in Ban Saikaew Village, Tambon Taling Chan; one police officer was killed and two others were injured. **Bangkok Post (11/21/17) The Nation (11/21/17) BenarNews (11/22/17)**


On 29 NOV, authorities recovered an IED cache in a rice field in Moo 15 Tambon Don Chimplee, Bang Name Prieo, Chachoengsao, after receiving a tip-off from a local villager. Authorities linked the cache to the bombing in Bangkok during the 2014 coup. During the investigation, authorities identified items within the cache had matching serial numbers to the evidence from the 2014 political chaos. The cache contained 30 hand grenades, seven PVC pipe bombs, a TNT stick, two M79 grenades, three bars of C4, 12 AK-47 magazines each containing 30 rounds of ammunition and 1,799 7.62 cartridges as well as bomb fuses. **Bangkok Post (12/01/17) The Nation (12/04/17)**

On 30 NOV, an RCIED weighing 25 kg detonated along Cho Airong-Ban Taning Road, Narathiwat; two civilians were injured. The IED incorporated a cooking gas cylinder hidden in a drainage pipe under the road. **Bangkok Post (11/30/17) Phuket Gazette 11/30/17)**

November IED activity remained consistently low with previous months. While there have been elevated instances of attacks in early November in previous years to commemorate the Tak Bai Incident, media did not report unusual Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) activity this year.

The attacks conducted in November are consistent with southern insurgency TTPs with the exception of the recent discovery of a large weapons cache located a few hours northeast of Bangkok. Military officials identified the cache to be tied to the political unrest in 2014. This event could re-ignite political turmoil, since the accused are not typical southern insurgents but former military and political figures with known ties to the Redshirts, formerly known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD).

In the coming months, it is likely that IED activity will remain consistent with previous months, and primarily involve attacks on security forces by southern insurgents. It is possible that IED activity could increase if political turmoil reignites since the year-long mourning of the late King Bhumibol and the royal cremation ceremonies ended in October.



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: November IED Events



There were two IED found and cleared events.


On 10 NOV, authorities found and cleared an IED in Mawrawadi, Maungtaw, Maungdaw, Rakhine. A farmer reported the device to authorities after finding it in a plastic bag on his rice field. The device was constructed of a vehicle engine piston, and measured five inches by 10 inches. **Global New Light of Myanmar (11/15/17)**

On 15 NOV, four RCIEDs were found and cleared between mile markers 243 and 244 on Yangon-Sittway Road near Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun, Rakhine. The first three IEDs were discovered buried in three dirt mounds 20 feet apart. Further examination of the road revealed the fourth IED buried separately. **Shwe Myanmar (11/16/17)**

Media reports on the use of IEDs in Burma remain low. The violence in the Rakhine State continues to be dominated by the confrontations between state actors and groups they consider to be anti-government, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).

Any increases in IED use will likely be attributed to anti-government groups. These groups have proven themselves capable of executing coordinated IED attacks, as seen during the ARSA attacks in October 2016 and August 2017. The 15 NOV event was the first mention of RCIED use in an attempted coordinated attack, though RCIEDs have been discovered/used in Rakhine state before. In the coming months it is likely that IED activity will continue at low levels, unless another large-scale coordinated attack is executed.


Past Year IED Events by Type




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[Return to first page](#)

Malaysia: November IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED cache event.

On 14 NOV, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of a group of Filipino fishermen believed to have been involved in blast fishing activity off the waters of Pulau Mantanani, Sabah. The cache contained 50 IEDs with an ammonium nitrate main charge and 50 detonators. **The Borneo Post (11/15/17) Daily Express (11/29/17)**

IED activity in Malaysia remains consistently low for the month of November. Incidents resulting from blast fishing are common in Malaysia, with one estimate suggesting that hundreds of blast fishing incidents occur within Sabah waters every year. The Malaysian government is attempting to counter this activity through education, providing fishermen with alternative sources of income, and employing acoustic surveillance to catch fish bombers. Earlier this year the Sabah Minister of Tourism, Culture, and Environment announced that his department is looking to place the waters surrounding Mantanani island, the area where the 14 NOV IED cache was recovered, under a protected status.

Northeast Asia: November Significant Activity

China

In November, Mongolia issued a statement requiring all 1,200 North Koreans working in the country to leave by the end of December due to United Nations sanctions curbing trade with Pyongyang. Worldwide, there are approximately 100,000 North Koreans living and working, with the majority found in China and Russia. North Korean workers send around USD 500 million in wages back to North Korea each year, with the government taking 70 to 90 percent of the worker's monthly wages. Other countries (such as Angola, Qatar, and Poland) will also likely be sending their North Korean workers back when construction contracts expire over the next year. **Gulf News (12/3/17)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
November 2017	29	30	31	1	2	3	4
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24	25
	26 NEP IND	27	28	29	30	1	2
December 2017	3	4	5	6 IND	7 NEP	8	9
	10	11	12	13	14 IND	15	16 BNG
	17	18	19	20	21	22 IND	23
	24	25 IND	26	27	28	29	30
January 2018	31	1	2	3	4 BUR	5	6
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 IND WW	27 WW
	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW	3 WW

IND – India
 NEP – Nepal
 BUR – Burma
 BNG – Bangladesh
 PHL – Philippines
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PN – Partner Nation
CIV – Civilian	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	QRF – Quick Response Force
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SA – South Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SAF – Small Arms Fire
F/C – Found & Cleared	SEA – Southeast Asia
HME – Homemade Explosives	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
IDF – Indirect Fire	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KIA – Killed in Action	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
LOC – Line of Communication	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	WIA – Wounded in Action
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	NPA – New People's Army
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	PNP – Philippine National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	UWSA – United Wa State Army
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	YCL – Youth Communist League
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	